David Myatt from London Business School will speak in the theory seminar next Thursday 17 January at 3:30 pm on ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Voter Turnout’.
Davids research interests include game theory, macroeconomic coordination and theoretical industrial organisation.
I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are instrumentally motivated. The unique equilibrium predicts substantial turnout under reasonable conditions, and greater turnout for the apparent underdog helps to offset the expected advantage of the perceived leader. I also present clear predictions about the response of turnout and the election outcome to various parameters, including the importance of the election; the cost of voting; the perceived popularity of each candidate; and the accuracy of pre-election information sources, such as opinion polls.
David's paper is available here: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/news_events/conferences/politicalecon/turnout-2012.pdf
Staff and PhD students who would like to meet with David please contact Michael Mandler who is co-ordinating this seminar series.