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Wednesday (External) Research Seminar

03/10/2012 (16:00-17:30)

Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure

Eduardo Perez (Ecole Polytechnique - Paris)


This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in senders-receiver games, games with strategic complementarities, and voting with deliberation.

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Eduardo is a coauthor of Sotiris Georganas who co-ordinates the Wednesday (External) Research Seminar 


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